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People generally have imperfect introspective access to the mechanisms underlying
their political beliefs, yet can confidently communicate the reasoning that goes into their
decision making process. An innate desire for certainty and security in ones beliefs
may play an important and somewhat automatic role in motivating the maintenance
or rejection of partisan support. The aim of the current study was to clarify the role
of the DLPFC in the alteration of political beliefs. Recent neuroimaging studies have
focused on the association between the DLPFC (a region involved in the regulation of
cognitive conflict and error feedback processing) and reduced affiliation with opposing
political candidates. As such, this study used a method of non-invasive brain simulation
(tRNS) to enhance activity of the bilateral DLPFC during the incorporation of political
campaign information. These findings indicate a crucial role for this region in political
belief formation. However, enhanced activation of DLPFC does not necessarily result in
the specific rejection of political beliefs. In contrast to the hypothesis the results appear
to indicate a significant increase in conservative values regardless of participant’s initial
political orientation and the political campaign advertisement they were exposed to.
Keywords: transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), political
neuroscience, cognitive dissonance, goal directed reasoning, unconscious processing, belief formation
INTRODUCTION
“So convenient a thing is it to be a rational creature, since it enables us to find ormake reason for everything
one has a mind to” -Ben Franklin
Ideology has been described as a “powerful motivational force” (Jost and Amodio, 2012), so
strongly inspirational that it enables individuals and groups to maintain reason for an abstract
configuration of ideas and values, often to the detriment of their own lives. Contemporary
politics are characterized by partisanship and polarization, with clearly defined lines separating the
ideologies of a liberal or conservative, left- or right- wing orientation. Therefore, it is no surprise
that these labels offer a strong sense of social identity and moral contentment toward ones political
affiliation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hardin and Higgins, 1996).
However, As Lieberman and Schreiber (2003) point out; in terms of belief formation, particularly
with regards to political thinking, people are generally unaware of how little insight they have into
their own decision making process. Given that most individuals are capable of orientating to two
or more sides of a political debate, the way in which they subsequently appraise political issues
may be strongly influenced by the specific feelings aroused during the early stages of processing
(Lodge and Taber, 2013). This poses a challenge to the credibility of self-report measures in politics,
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with increasing need for an investigation into the stability of
political beliefs and the neural basis of partisan support.
The intensity and pervasiveness of political belief systems has
been recently attributed to the uncertainty-reducing function
of ideology (Jost and Amodio, 2012). For instance, researchers
have argued that, rather than providing a means of emotional
satisfaction per se, ideology is motivating because it offers
a rationalization mechanism of coping with anxiety and
uncertainty, thereby conferring existential security (Hogg, 2007;
Jost et al., 2009). Therefore, political beliefs manifest a divergence
from purely self-interested decisions, with social categorization
demonstrating enhanced activity in reward-related regions of the
brain (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Lee, 2008; Lowenstein et al.,
2008).
According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957),
the simultaneous processing of two or more conflicting
cognitions, results in a psychologically uncomfortable state of
arousal. This is thought to initiate a motivational mechanism
through which one alters their preferences and beliefs to be
more consistent with the displayed behavior. Therefore, executive
control mechanisms appear to be involved in the rationalization
process whereby the outcome is based on an inhibition of
currently suboptimal responses (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008;
Mansouri et al., 2009). Studies have suggested an indispensable
role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in this process
due to its role in encoding and maintaining short-term memory
of experienced conflicts, as well as in adjusting the level of
cognitive control according to previous experience (Petrides,
2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Tsujimoto and Sawaguchi, 2004,
2005; Genovesio et al., 2006; Mansouri et al., 2007; Weissman
et al., 2008). For example, fMRI studies have demonstrated
enhanced activity of the bilateral DLPFC during the processing
of political judgments which are paired with respectively
inconsistent political information (Westen et al., 2006; Kaplan
et al., 2007). Similarly, DLPFC has also been implicated during
the observation of opposing candidate faces, with greater activity
representing reduced affiliation with the opposing candidate as
well as their associated political position (Knutson et al., 2006;
Westen et al., 2006; Kaplan et al., 2007; Zamboni et al., 2009).
Of particular importance to the current investigation, Kato
et al. (2009) provide evidence that distinct prefrontal areas
of the brain are associated with different cognitive control
mechanisms following exposure to negative representations of
their initially favored political candidate. Consistent with earlier
studies of emotion biased reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Thagard,
2003; Westen et al., 2005, 2006); persistent support for one’s
political ideology or candidate, was shown to be associated
with activity in both the ventral medial and anterior prefrontal
cortices. This research points to the specific role of emotion
and reward in the maintenance, as opposed to rejection of
political support. In contrast, a negative correlation was found
between the activation level of bilateral DLPFC and preference
for previously supported candidates following exposure to both
negative and positive political campaigns. That is, DLPFC activity
was stronger in those who changed their preferences for initially
preferred political candidates regardless of the emotional content
of the advertisement.
These findings provide support for qualitatively different
neural processes underlying goal-directed behavior. Specifically,
it points to the role of a deliberative mechanism for the regulation
and control of behavior and a more intuitive mechanism that
underlies emotionally significant decision making (e.g., Dunbar
and Fugelsang, 2005). The specific enhancement of activity in
DLPFC during belief alteration has been interpreted as the
neural basis for inductive reasoning (Goel and Dolan, 2004; Kato
et al., 2009). That is, regardless of the individual’s prior beliefs,
including the strength of their emotional involvement (Kato
et al., 2009), error feedback processing in the DLPFC appears
to signal an informative cue that one has made an incorrect
decision. In effect, this initiates goal directed action to alter their
thinking process when presented with a similar choice in the
future (Walton et al., 2004; Zanolie et al., 2008).
From the perspective of social information processing;
this could be taken to suggest an inconsistency between
experienced and expected social norms. Importantly, research
has demonstrated that the detection of non-compliant behavior
and its subsequent corrective action depend on the same
neurocognitive mechanisms that are known to be involved
in goal-directed actions in non-social domains. For example,
Klucharev et al. (2009) used a face attractiveness rating task to
investigate how subject’s ratings were influenced by normative
group opinion. They found that a conflict of opinion led
to enhanced activation in the posterior medial frontal cortex
(pMFC) and a deactivation in reward related regions of the brain
(NAc). The pMFC closely interacts with the lateral prefrontal
cortex (LPFC), which in turn, implements the necessary top-
down control (Kerns et al., 2004; Carter and Van Veen, 2007).
This would explain the alteration in beliefs that occurs following
increased activation of these regions (Klucharev et al., 2009;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). Further, recent research
has demonstrated that Cathodal tDCS (negatively charged
electrodes) over the lateral prefrontal cortex decreases the
expected behavioral adjustments that would typically occur
following deviations of social norm compliance (Ruff et al., 2013).
Interestingly, this is the same region that predicted individual
differences in post-choice change in preference in non-social
contexts (Jarcho et al., 2010; Qin et al., 2011; Mengarelli et al.,
2013). Such a finding could be taken to suggest that the rejection
of partisan supportmay be based on the same process of cognitive
conflict that appears to determine alterations of preference and
choice in non-political domains.
In light of this previous research, the aim of the current
study was to provide evidence for a causal contribution of
bilateral DLPFC in the alteration of political beliefs, and hence,
partisan support. More specifically, it was hypothesized that
activation of the DLPFC with a non-invasive brain stimulation
would facilitate belief alteration if participants were exposed to
a political campaign consistent with their initial belief during
the stimulation. For example, those exposed to the Labor
Party campaign were expected to display a change in initial
political beliefs toward that of a more conservative, or right-
wing (Conservative Party) orientation following transcranial
stimulation of bilateral DLPFC. Therefore, despite ones initial
political support, as well as the strength of their ideological
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position, the experience of cognitive dissonance and behavioral
inhibition (initiated through enhanced DLPFC activity) was
expected to result in an unfavorable impression of the observed
campaign as reflected in strong support for the opposing party
ideology.
Tomodulate the activity level of bilateral DLPFC, we delivered
transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS) bilaterally over
these regions. It has been demonstrated that tRNS can
modulate cortical excitability through the delivery of a randomly
oscillating, bidirectional current (Terney et al., 2008). The
particular importance of this technique is in its ability to avoid
the homeostatic neural mechanisms, or hyper-polarization that
have been observed during the repeated use of transcranial
direct current (tDCS) techniques (Siebner et al., 2004; Stagg
and Nitsche, 2011). In effect, any influence which tRNS may
have on altering political beliefs will attest to its increasing
potential in cognitive-neuroscience research in general. Further,
any change in political beliefs which represent an opposing
preference to that of the observed party campaign, could be
taken as novel support for dissociable positive and negative
regulatory networks within the later prefrontal cortex. That
is, it may suggest a role for the DLPFC in the engagement
of controlled processes implicated during the up-regulation of
negative affect (Ochsner et al., 2004; Kaplan et al., 2007; Amodio
et al., 2008).
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-six Sussex University students (Female; n = 21, Male;
n = 15) between the ages of 20–30 (mean= 24.6, SD± 2.4) took
part in the current study. All subjects presented written informed
consent and were naive to both the purpose of the study, as
well as the functions of transcranial random noise stimulation
(tRNS). Participants were recruited through email and personal
contact with the researcher and were excluded based on the
criteria of neurological and psychiatric disorders (Poreisz et al.,
2007; Rossi et al., 2009). All subjects used in this study were
selected on the basis of social demographics, whereby they were
required to have lived in Britain for a minimum of the past 3
years.
Design
A 2X2 between-subjects design has been used, whereby two
independent groups of participants participated in either an
experimental condition involving the use of tRNS, or a
control condition which involved a non-active, sham stimulation
technique. Each stimulation group (experimental/sham) was
further divided based on the political campaign video they
were required to watch during the experiment. Therefore, the
conditions used in the current study were as follows; tRNS +
liberal, tRNS + conservative (experimental conditions), sham
stimulation + liberal, and sham stimulation + conservative
(control conditions). The change in political orientation from
pre- to post-test has been calculated as the dependent
variable.
Transcranial Random Noise Stimulation
(tRNS)
The experimental condition involved applying tRNS over the
bilateral DLPFC while subjects watched either a liberal or
conservative party campaign. In the case of the control condition;
non-active sham stimulation was applied while subjects watched
one of the two campaign videos. The positions of the electrodes
were the F3 and F4 positions of the international EEG 10–20
system (Fecteau et al., 2007a,b; Knoch et al., 2008; Keeser et al.,
2011). The electrodes (7 × 5 cm) were covered with a sponge
soaked with saline solution and stabilized using rubber bands.
For the active tRNS condition, random noise current, driven
by a battery–operated electrical stimulator (NeuroConn DC–
Stimulator Plus) was gradually increased to a designated level
of 2mA at a sampling rate of 1280 samples per second (high
frequency 101–640Hz). The duration of stimulation was pre–
programmed to 600 s using the CE approved stimulation device
(DC-STIMULATOR PLUS; NeuroConn, Ilmenau, Germany).
Transcranial stimulation was automatically terminated on
reaching the required duration. The stimulation was also
programmed to fade in/out over a duration of 20 s during at the
beginning and end of the stimulation period.
tRNS stimulation began with the onset of the political
campaign videos which lasted between 4.5 and 4.10min in
duration. Following the campaign video, participants required
a further 6–8min to complete the BIS, memory test, and post-
test political attitude questionnaire (political knowledge was
measured at the end of the study and was independent of
stimulation–related changes in neural activity). tRNS has been
shown to enhance cortical activity for an extended period of
time beyond that of the actual stimulation procedure; 10min
tRNS induces an increase of MEP amplitude which is significant
for up to 40min post-stimulation (Laczó et al., 2014). As the
entire experiment (beginning with the onset of stimulation) took
approximately 12–15min, the influence of DLPFC excitability
was well within the period of tRNS after effects. Figure 1
(Experimental timeline) the control (sham) stimulation was
accomplished by beginning the stimulation current in an
identical manner to that of the active stimulation condition,
but fading out after 20 s. Thus, participants perceived the
initial tingling beneath the electrodes while receiving no active
stimulation current for the rest of the experiment procedure.
Recent research has demonstrated that study participants are
generally unable to distinguish between active and non-active
tRNS stimulation (Fertonani et al., 2011), suggesting that the
absence of an active control site should not limit the reliability
of results in the current study. Measures were also taken to
ensure that no information about the stimulation procedure was
communicated to participants prior to completion of the study.
Procedure and Analysis
Two pilot studies were carried out prior to experimentation.
An independent group of 20 students were recruited to ensure
that the political statements used in the current study were
representative of a highly liberal or highly conservative ideology.
The aim was to avoid any ambiguity with respect to particular
political orientation being assessed. Conceptually ambiguous
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental Timeline (tRNS Stimulation).
statements were removed leaving a total of 14 items per statement
questionnaire. An additional 20 students were recruited to
ensure that the questions referring to one’s political knowledge
were evenly divided into low, medium, and high levels of
political knowledge. The knowledge questions to be used in
the current study were subsequently based on the number of
correct or incorrect answers provided by the sample of pilot study
subjects. The research has been approved by the Sciences and
Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC)
ethical process (ER/CC460/1), and was carried out in accordance
with the British Psychological Society (BPS) code of conduct.
Participants were processed individually in a brain stimulation
lab, whereby they were randomly assigned to a control or
experimental condition. Twenty students (Female; n = 11, Male;
n = 9) took part in the main stimulation experiment, with 16
subjects (Female; n = 10, Male; n = 6) assigned to the control
condition. The conditions, however, were conducted by the same
investigator, who was not blind with regard to the stimulation
condition. Before beginning the experiment, all subjects were
provided with an over-view of the study. The aim of the research
was presented as a novel approach to investigating the neural
basis of political beliefs. Each participant was further provided
with a set of questionnaires (see Appendix A–D; 1–4) designed
to measure political orientation prior to, and after viewing
the allocated campaign advertisement (which was combined
with tRNS or sham stimulation). The same questionnaires were
administered to every participant. Participants were advised that
the stimulation procedure would be applied as soon as they
began answering the first set of political statement questions. The
purpose of this was to prevent any bias in behavior change on
beginning transcranial stimulation.
After reading the experimental instructions, and having them
explained in detail by the experimenter, all subjects were asked
to begin answering the first set of political attitude statements by
coding one answer for each of the statements presented. Subjects
were asked to relax and view the campaign video that followed,
listening carefully to the argument put forward by the political
candidate. Transcranial stimulation (active/sham) was initiated
immediately with the onset of the political campaigns. Following
the campaign videos, participants were required to answer
questions referring to behavioral inhibition and their memory for
the informational content covered by the political candidate. This
was followed by the second set of political attitude statements
and a political knowledge questionnaire. Participants were asked
explicitly not to record their names on the questionnaires
and were told that their answers would be immediately
intermixed with those of the other participants. Participants were
discouraged from selecting “socially acceptable” answers, and
were advised to answer as honestly as possible throughout the
study session.
In terms of Analysing political orientation; a score of 1,
always represented a “highly liberal” attitude, whereas a score
of 7 always represented a “highly conservative” attitude. Scores
on each questionnaire were combined (after reverse scoring the
items based on liberal-conservative direction) to provide a single
measure of political orientation with higher numbers indicating
a greater preference for Conservative, as opposed to Liberal
political policies.
Materials
Two political campaign videos were prepared, each of which was
intended to portray a particular political orientation. Each of
the videos was designed to reflect the most recent conservative
(right–wing) or liberal (left–wing) policies proposed by the
Conservative and Labor Parties. The topics which were covered
in the campaign videos were designed to be as similar as possible,
including topics relating to economic and political equality,
collectivism/individualism and government control/free
enterprise. The informational points were communicated in a
similar sequence, with a similar length of time assigned to each
topic. Therefore, both campaign videos were almost identical
with respect to their total length, with 4.10min allocated to the
Labor Party (Ed Miliband) campaign and 4.05min allocated to
the conservative party (David Cameron) campaign. Both the
recording quality and loudness of campaign videos were kept
constant.
Two political attitude surveys were also designed to measure
subject’s political orientation before- and after-viewing the
campaign video. Both attitude surveys consisted of a 14 item,
additive Likert scale (Likert, 1932), designed to cover the main
theoretical components of the liberal/-conservative political
orientation. The 14 items on each survey were based as closely as
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possible on the campaign content, including statements referring
to economic and political equality as well as collectivism and
government control. All of the statements used in the current
study were adapted from widely accepted political attitude
surveys (e.g., World Values Survey, EES voter survey, European
social survey, and British social attitudes survey, American
National Election studies), attesting to the validity of the current
liberal/-conservative attitude scale. Reliability estimates (see
Results) further demonstrate that both liberal and conservative
subscales maintain a standardized level of internal consistency,
with all statement items appearing worthy of retention.
Each of the statements were phrased in an agree/disagree
format, consisting of a seven-point Likert response scale
(strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, neither agree nor disagree,
slightly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree). In order to avoid
the confounding influence of acquiescence effects, each set of
items within a political attitude survey contained some question
statements that were worded in one direction and some in the
opposite direction (Schuman and Presser, 1981). Therefore, the
selected items within each of the two surveys were balanced for
question direction, with half the questions being worded in the
direction of a highly liberal attitude and the other half worded
in the direction of a highly conservative attitude (e.g., “Taxes
should be as low as possible even if welfare spending suffers,”
“Income tax should be increased for people on higher than average
incomes”). In addition, the statement questions between the
two surveys were matched as closely as possible with regard
to particular attitude being assessed (e.g., “Taxes and spending
should be increased in order to improve health and education,”
“Government should provide fewer services, even in health and
education in order to reduce spending”). Importantly, none of the
statement questions were repeated at any stage in either of the
attitude surveys. The purpose of this was to minimize retrieval of
previously held beliefs.
A modified version of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS)
was designed to cover four points relating to subjects current
experience of anxiety, frustration, fear, and trustworthiness of
the political campaign/-candidate they were exposed to (see
Reliability Estimates).
To ensure that subjects paid attention to the campaign videos,
we included a memory test for informational content. Seven
questions were adopted from the main points covered by the
candidates in each of the campaign speeches.
We also probed participant’s political knowledge by
administering a questionnaire consisting of 12 questions
relating to current and past events in Britain, which were
selected on the basis of number of correct responses displayed
by participants in the pilot study. Four of these questions were
consistently regarded as easy, four were found to be of medium
difficulty, and four were found to be most difficult as determined
by a similar student population.
RESULTS
Reliability Estimates
The scores for each political attitude survey were divided into
either a liberal or conservative subscale. Reliability estimates (i.e.,
cronbachs alpha) demonstrate that both liberal (a = 0.67) and
conservative (a = 0.78) political attitude subscales appeared to
have good internal consistency, with all items appearing worthy
of retention.
Effects of tRNS on Political Attitude
Change
Political Attitude Changes after Watching Political
Campaign Videos Are Summarized in Table 1 per
Group
A 2X2 ANOVA was carried out, with stimulation group (sham
vs. tRNS) and campaign video (liberal vs. conservative) as the
independent between-subject’s variables. Total political attitude
change from pre- to post-test was calculated as the dependent
variable.
Results indicate a significant main effect of stimulation group
on subsequent change in political beliefs from pre- to post-
test; F(1, 29) = 25.14, p < 0.001, η
2 = 0.2, with a higher
mean belief change for tRNS stimulation conditions (M =
12.01) than that observed in the control stimulation conditions
(M = 0.80). Therefore, the type of stimulation (tRNS or sham)
appears to have a significant influence on changes in political
orientation regardless of the political campaign participants had
experienced.
However, when the type of stimulation was ignored, the
political campaign video (liberal vs. conservative) had no
significant main effect on political attitude change from pre- to
post-test; F(1,29) = 2.54, p = 0.12, η
2 = 0.02. When the influence
of stimulation is removed, liberal, and conservative campaign
groups appeared to score similarly on political attitudes; (Labor;
M = 8.13; Conservative; M = 4.67), indicating that the
particular campaign video that subjects were exposed to had no
influence on subsequent alterations in political orientation.
In contrast to our expected hypothesis; results did not
show any significant interaction between campaign group and
stimulation type; F(1, 29) = 0.30, p = 0.58, η
2 = 0.2. This
finding suggests that the effect of stimulation on political attitude
change did not facilitate belief change as a result of watching
the political campaigns per se. Those in the experimental (tRNS)
groups appear to score higher on trait conservatism [higher
scores represent conservative ideology/lower scores represent
liberal ideology] regardless of whether they had been exposed
to a Labor party or Conservative party campaign (Labor; M =
14.35; Conservative; M = 9.67). Those in the sham stimulation
conditions exhibited little change in their political attitude from
pre- to post-test.
TABLE 1 | Means and SD for total political attitude change.
Stimulation Campaign Group Means SD N
Control Labor 1.88 1.64 8
Conservative 0.00 4.17 8
tRNS Labor 14.60 7.97 10
Conservative 9.20 7.06 10
SD, standard deviations; n, number of participants.
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These results demonstrate a significant increase in
conservative political orientation following tRNS stimulation
regardless of whether liberal or conservative campaign
advertisements were viewed by participants.
A Three-way mixed ANOVA was also conducted in order
to identify whether an interaction exists between stimulation
group (sham vs. tRNS), campaign video (liberal vs. conservative)
and political attitude scores from pre- to post-test. Stimulation
group, campaign video, and time (pre vs. post) were used as the
independent between/within-subject’s variables. Mean political
attitude change was calculated as the dependent variable.
There was no significant interaction between stimulation type,
campaign video, and pre–post political attitude scores; F(1, 32) =
0.81, p = 0.37, η2p = 0.02. There was also no significant
interaction between campaign video (liberal vs. conservative) and
political attitude scores from pre–post test; F(1, 32) = 3.4, p =
0.08, η2p = 0.09. Consistent with our previous results; the only
significant interaction was found between stimulation type and
pre–post political attitude change; F(1, 32) = 29.5, p < 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.48 (Figure 2).
To ensure that these results were not driven by unexpected
biases in the initial political orientation across the groups (see
Table 2), we tested whether the initial political attitude interacted
with political attitude change. First, a One-way ANOVA was
conducted to test any baseline difference in initial political
attitudes across each of the groups of subjects. The results
indicated no significant difference between participants on initial
political orientation F(3, 32) = 2.4, p = 0.06, Ñ = 0.3. Given
the uneven sample sizes, a non-parametric Spearman’s test was
used to determine the correlation between prior-political beliefs
and total political attitude change. No significant correlation was
found; r = −0.24, p (one-tailed) = 0.07. A one-tailed test was
carried out as the original hypothesis suggested a change in
conservative individuals toward that of a more liberal political
orientation and vice versa.
However, we also carried out a 2 (control/tRNS) X 2
(Labor/Conservative) ANOVA in order to determine whether the
noticeably high p-value may have been affected by the campaign
or stimulation groups that participants were assigned to. The
results appear to indicate a significant main effect of campaign
group (Labor/Conservative) on initial political orientation;
F(1, 32) = 5.13, p < 0.05, η
2 = 0.004. Therefore, despite the
non-significant interaction between initial political attitudes and
post-test attitude change; we cannot ignore the findings that
indicate significant differences in political beliefs ever before
the experimental procedure had begun. More specifically, the
Conservative campaign group appeared to demonstrate a lower
level of conservative or right-wing ideology (M = 39.4, SD= 2.7)
and the Labor campaign group demonstrated a higher rating
on this scale (M = 46.5, SD = 2.7). The raw political
attitude scores for pre- and post-stimulation are demonstrated in
Figure 3.
Interaction with Auxiliary Variables
We further examined whether the degree of political attitude
change was moderated by other relevant auxiliary variables
collected in this study (see Methods). However, we did not find
any significant interaction between the degree of attitude change
and other variables. First, political knowledge had no significant
effect on belief change following tRNS stimulation; F(1, 29) =
0.07, p = 0.78. This would suggest that, despite one’s personal
affiliation and strength of political support, enhanced activity
of DLPFC has the potential to revoke pre-existing partisan
support.
TABLE 2 | Means and SD for political attitude: pre–post stimulation.
Stimulation Campaign Group Means SD N
Pre-Control Labor 49.13 17.22 8
Conservative 44.25 8.56 8
Pre-tRNS Labor 43.80 8.50 10
Conservative 35.20 7.39 10
Post-Control Labor 51.00 16.91 8
Conservative 44.25 10.61 8
Post-tRNS Labor 58.40 8.28 10
Conservative 44.30 9.43 10
SD, standard deviations, n, number of participants.
FIGURE 2 | (A) Labor Party Campaign: mean political attitude. (B) Conservative Party Campaign: mean political attitude.
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FIGURE 3 | Political attitude scores: Pre-post stimulation campaign.
Second, the results showed no significant interaction between
behavioral inhibition scores; F(1, 29) = 0.99, p = 0.32, or between
memory for informational content; F(1, 29) = 0.88, p = 0.35
and subsequent change in political orientation. This contrasts
with the role of DLPFC in cognitive dissonance reduction and
avoidance-based motivation.
Finally, the change in political belief formation was
independent of gender; F(1, 29) = 0.50, p = 0.50, and age
of participants (20–30 years); F(1, 29) = 0.01, p = 0.90.
DISCUSSION
The current study aimed to specify a causal contribution of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in altering political belief
formation using a non-invasive brain stimulation technique
(tRNS). The results did not support our original hypothesis that
excitation of DLPFC with tRNS would facilitate alteration of
political attitudes in response to watching campaign videos.
The findings of the current study indicate a crucial role of the
DLPFC in political belief formation. However, the direction of
this change was somewhat contradictory to the previous research.
That is, the findings of the current study appear to only partly
support those of Kato et al. (2009), which indicate the specific
rejection of partisan support following enhanced activation of
bilateral DLPFC.
Among the participants who were exposed to the Labor party
(liberal) campaign, the change in subsequent political beliefs was
in the expected direction, and represented a significant increase
in conservatism or right-wing ideology. That is, despite the
similarity in political statements, participants nonetheless placed
their political preferences along a more conservative dimension
following exposure to the Labor Party campaigns. From the
outset, this finding appears to provide support for previous
research indicating a specific role for the bilateral DLPFC in
inductive (as opposed to deductive) reasoning (Goel and Dolan,
2004), thereby resulting in the rejection of support for the
political candidate and party policies (e.g., Kato et al., 2009).
However, if this change in political beliefs were a reflection
of some kind of cognitive control or error feedback associated
with the inconsistent intentions of the candidate/-campaign
(e.g., Weissman et al., 2008; Burke et al., 2010), then we would
also expect the Conservative Party campaign group to shown a
similar rejection of the political ideology proposed. Surprisingly,
however, this was not the case. Rather than rejecting conservative
views, and altering beliefs accordingly (i.e., demonstrating
increasing liberal ideology), enhanced DLPFC activity during
the incorporation of Conservative Party campaigns actually led
to a significant increase in conservative (as opposed to liberal)
political beliefs. Contrary to our hypothesis, tRNS over DLPFC
appeared to result in increased Conservative beliefs regardless
of the political campaign subjects were exposed to. This finding
would further indicate a null result in terms of the general up-
regulation of negative affect associated with the right DLPFC
(Ochsner et al., 2004; Kaplan et al., 2007; Amodio et al.,
2008).
Avoidance-Regulation and Conservatism
This particular pattern of results may be explained in terms of the
specific psychological and neurological differences that underlie
conservative and liberal belief systems (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a,
2007). As pointed out by Jost and Amodio (2012), it is limiting
to suggest that two opposing political ideologies, which are based
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on advocating social change and rejecting inequality on the one
hand, and maintaining tradition and acceptance of inequality
on the other, could nonetheless depend on similar motivational
processes. These highly opposing values must somehow originate
in different cognitive mechanisms underlying motivation toward
uncertainty and threat reduction.
If this is the case, then the enhanced cognitive dissonance and
resulting avoidance motivation may not be associated with the
observed candidate and party policies per se, but may reflect a
general predisposition to avoid all uncertain and anxiety evoking
situations which one may be exposed to. With this in mind,
enhanced DLPFC may have resulted in an increased preference
for security, certainty, and social dominance; traits which have
been proposed as the defining characteristics of a conservative
or right-wing ideology (Jost et al., 2003a,b, 2007; Weber and
Federico, 2007; Federico et al., 2011). This is in contrast to
traits of openness to social change and tolerance of uncertainty
which are typically associated with a liberal belief system (e.g.,
Jost et al., 2004, 2008; Nosek et al., 2009). Such a proposal
would lead us to suggest that the specific regulatory process
(i.e., enhanced error feedback/cognitive conflict) evoked with
transcranial stimulationmay have biased the participants in favor
of more conservative values and beliefs. Indeed, recent studies
in political psychology have begun to document the differential
regulatory mechanisms underlying right- and left-wing ideology
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, 2009), with
recent fMRI investigations demonstrating a specific relationship
between multi-dimensional scales of conservatism and activity
of the right DLPFC (e.g., Zamboni et al., 2009). Zamboni and
colleagues further discuss these findings in terms of a heightened
sense of cognitive dissonance between self-interest and fairness
that results in more complex social judgments in Conservative
individuals.
Avoidance-Regulation and Preference
Change
Despite the plausibility of a specific association between
avoidance–based motivation and conservatism, it is necessary to
point out the pre-existing characteristics of the sample groups
used in the current study. Specifically, it is unrealistic to assume
that the change in political orientation was devoid of prior
preferences and beliefs. A particularly important finding that
has been demonstrated in the current study is that of the null
relationship or insignificant interaction between the campaign
videos (Labor vs. Conservative) and transcranial stimulation.
This would suggest that any change in political beliefs was
exclusively the result of DLPFC activity and not necessarily due
to the incorporation of the campaign information. Therefore,
it remains important to acknowledge that despite the non-
significant relationship between prior beliefs and changing
political orientation, the subjects used in this particular study
were nonetheless of a relatively liberal political orientation, with
none of the participants scoring highly on initial conservative
beliefs. Given the lack of any interaction between the campaign
videos and that of DLPFC stimulation, the current findings,
which represent a significant belief change in the direction of a
conservative orientation, may actually conform to the expected
results. Consistent with the research by Kato and colleagues,
the significant alteration in political beliefs toward that of a
conservative orientation could be taken to indicate a reduced
affiliation of liberal individuals toward that of their initially
supported political values.
If this proposal is taken to be true, then enhanced DLPFC
activity could be taken to suggest a specific regulatorymechanism
that underlies the rejection, as opposed to maintenance of
political beliefs. Such a proposal would be in contrast to the
assertion of avoidance–based regulation as a process specifically
related to enhancing conservative beliefs. On the contrary,
it would seem to suggest a specific role for the DLPFC in
inducing a state of cognitive conflict toward existing political
beliefs in general. This proposal would also be consistent with
previous research on the neural basis of social conformity,
whereby a prediction-error signal indicates the need to change
one’s opinion to meet that of normative group opinion
(Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011).
However, recent research has begun to identify the role
of a conflict mindset in reducing the tendency of people to
over-estimate outgroup dissimilarity (Stern and Kleiman, 2015).
That is, rather than enhancing in-group-outgroup differences;
perceived distance is actually proposed to initiate a cognitive
process of considering alternative perspectives (Kleiman and
Hassin, 2013; Savary et al., 2015). This is of particular relevance
to studies of political belief formation whereby people tend
to view the attitudes of political outgroup members as being
more different from their own attitudes than they actually are
(Judd and Park, 1993; Robinson et al., 1995; Chambers et al.,
2006; Graham et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 2015). Therefore,
enhanced conflict monitoring and error-feedback processing
could alternatively activate a more accurate representation of
one’s belief system, rather than changing or altering political
beliefs per se.
Limitations and Future Research
Given the current results, and the lack of any interaction between
the campaign videos and cortical stimulation, we are left with
little confirmatory evidence for the specific mechanisms through
which DLPFC results in alteration of political beliefs. Future
studies should be conducted with a broader population and
greater sample of participants, thereby allowing for the inclusion
of both conservative and liberal orientations at pre-test. This
would inevitably shed light on the specific direction of belief
change following enhanced activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex. The small sample size used in the current study also
poses a major limitation to the reliability of our results. Given
that our participants were almost unanimously liberal in political
orientationatpre-test,wemustbecautious indrawingconclusions
from this sample. The statistical analysis provided should be
taken as support for future research, rather than in providing
a definitive role for the DLPFC in political belief change.
The lack of any active control site further poses a limitation to
the anatomical specificity of the DLPFC. With the current study,
it is difficult to decipher as to whether the specific brain region
being tested produces a behavioral affect that is significantly
different to that of an active control. It is also possible that that
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the stimulation procedure may have induced discomfort in some
participants, especially when applied over pre-frontal regions at
higher stimulation intensities. Any unspecific behavioral effect
could have had a substantial confounding effect on the reliability
of results. Therefore, future research would benefit from the
use of an active control site as opposed to a sham stimulation
technique. This would allow for a reliable comparison in
behavioral affects and the identification of a specific role for the
DLPFC in belief change.
It is also necessary to take into account the way in which
sensory information is represented in the brain by neurons. It
is important to recognize that the final response given by the
system is not based solely on the strength of the signal that codes
for the target (i.e., rate of neuronal firing), but on the signal
to noise ratio. That is, the ratio between the signal and other
Information unrelated to the stimuli (neuronal noise). Miniussi
et al. (2013) have argued that the “noise” induced by non-invasive
brain stimulation can obstruct the synchronized ratio between
the activity of neurons that code for the target and the activity
of other neurons that are non-specific to the activity of the task.
An uneven signal distribution caused by a sub-optimal level of
“noise” is said to decrease the final performance as the response of
neurons will not vary linearly with the characteristics of the target
stimulus (Miniussi et al., 2013). With this in mind, it is possible
that the tRNS induced noise could have enhanced trial variability,
thereby resulting in attitude ratings “in the middle of the scale.”
Given that the participants used in the current study were of a
relatively liberal political orientation at pre-test, it would not be
surprising that subsequent responses leaned toward a more pro-
conservative orientation. If this is the case, then we would also
expect participants who hold more conservative beliefs at pre-
test to demonstrate a move toward a more liberal orientation.
Unfortunately, cortical excitability alterations induced by tRNS
are not yet fully understood and more research will be needed in
this area in order to determine the influence of neuronal noise on
behavioral trial by trial variability.
It is also important to mention the non-significant relation
between political knowledge and subsequent change in beliefs.
Given that political knowledge is taken as a measure of
involvement; this finding would indicate the ability of DLPFC
activity to over-ride any pre–potent emotional or personal
response toward strongly held political beliefs. However, the
social demographic background of the participants used in
this study might pose limitations to its external validity.
The particular strength of political orientation and emotional
responses to current political events may be different to those
held by other social and economic groups in society.
A further limitation of this study exists in that the two
political attitude questionnaires were not counter-balanced prior
to carrying out the study. Despite the reliability of the liberal–
conservative scales being used, it would be beneficial for future
studies to carry out a pilot test with an external sample of
participants answering each questionnaire in a counter-balanced
fashion. This would ensure that the questions being asked on
each of the questionnaires are representative of the same political
orientation. It would also be beneficial for future research to use
more than one stimulus item (i.e., political campaign videos) as
a measure of political orientation. Different measures focus more
strongly on different components of attitudes, thereby allowing
for ensure greater power and reliability in statistical results.
In addition, it would be of interest for future neuro–
political research to look at the cerebral asymmetry of cognitive
regulation. This differential influence of right and left prefrontal
hemispheres might contribute to our understanding of the
possible up-regulation of negative affect which might occur
during partisan support, relative to the typical down-regulation
of unwanted negative affect as seen in studies of implicit race bias
toward out-groups (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004).
The activation of both left and right hemispheres during Kato
and colleagues study may have particular significance for altering
political beliefs. Left frontal regions have been consistently
associated with approach behavior, and are typically shown to
be activated when participants rate others more favorably due
to enhanced cognitive control over implicit negative emotions
(Richeson et al., 2003; Cunningham et al., 2004; Wood et al.,
2005). However, the additional involvement of right DLPFC may
lend support to earlier accounts of the up-regulation of negative
affect. That is, enhanced activation of right frontal regions
have been demonstrated during the experience of withdrawal
and anxiety, as well as in inhibitory behavior toward stimuli
which are perceived as threatening to the individual (Sutton and
Davidson, 1997; Dalton et al., 2005; Shackman et al., 2009). This
proposal is consistent with neural findings which indicate that
activation (as opposed to inhibition) of negative attitudes was
associated with activity of the right DLPFC, with the degree of
percentage change reflecting a correlation between trait and state
anxiety measures (Wood et al., 2005). Neuroimaging research has
further associated the right DLPFC with enhanced vigilance and
sustained attention which have been proposed to underlie ones
susceptibility to anxiety (Shackman et al., 2009). Such a proposal
is consistent with this regions possible role in monitoring the
behavioral representation of conflict as well as in controlling
thought modification via error feedback. Although these findings
are generally based on correlation, and do not necessarily address
the issue of causation; they nonetheless lend support to an
investigation of the bilateral DLPFC in political decision making,
which may ultimately determine the relative degree to which
political attitudes and prior beliefs are maintained or rejected.
Unconscious Rationalization
It is also interesting to note, that none of the participants
in the current study reported any awareness of changes to
their political beliefs, almost conclusively disagreeing with the
possibility that political thoughts and values had been altered
in any way. Therefore, during the conscious deliberation of
political statements, it appears as though implicit cognitive
control processes may have biased subsequent belief formation
in the absence of conscious awareness. Although research has
argued that rationalization and reappraisal must require some
degree of conscious deliberation (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-
Jones, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2002; Harmon-Jones et al., 2008; Van
Veen et al., 2009; Jarcho et al., 2011); the findings of the current
study would provide reason to speculate an unconscious role of
the DLPFC in changing political orientation.
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In support of this proposal, experimental investigations have
indicated the possibility of dissociable brain components for
executive control which appear to counter the notion that goal–
directed behavior primarily requires conscious deliberation (e.g.,
Ochsner et al., 2002). Specifically, studies have indicated the
presence of an operation goal programme on the one hand,
with the conscious knowledge of its operation on the other (e.g.,
Frith et al., 2000). As such, it is possible that autonomously
operated goals may guide cognition and behavior independent
of conscious intention (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000; Chartrand
and Bargh, 2002; Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2004; Bargh, 2005;
Dijkstehuis et al., 2007; Ferguson et al., 2008). Such a proposal
is consistent with recent research demonstrating that frontal lobe
control regions of the brain are not necessarily essential for the
generation of conscious volition (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007).
CONCLUSION
The findings of the current research question the reliability
of current models of conscious control and deliberate political
choice which currently dominant theories of human decision
making in political science. Strongly held political beliefs
appear to be surprisingly susceptible to alterations of neuronal
regulatory processes, which have the potential to alter political
belief systems as a function of inconsistent cognitive thought
processes. The findings of the present study do not attempt to
imply a deterministic or passive reflection of one’s beliefs and
attitudes; however, the ability of non-invasive stimulation to alter
belief formation attests to the instability of political support
and the powerful influence of uncertainty reduction in shaping
societies ideological orientations.
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